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The “Dutch Model” has attracted wide international attention for its presumed ability to reduce
unemployment, introduce market incentives in the former public domain, and maintain essential
provisions of the welfare state. This paper documents and evaluates policy changes, labor market
performance, and welfare reform, with emphasis on the institutional framework, its continuity, and the
reforms themselves.1Other analyses of the recent Dutch experience can be found in Broersma, Koeman, and Teulings (1999),
Nickell and van Ours (1999), Salverda (1998), Schettkat and Reijnders (1998), and Visser and Hemerijck (1997). A
broader comparative perspective is given in Auer (1999), with reference to the other papers of the ILO project.
Details on earlier periods in the Netherlands are given in Hartog and Theeuwes (1993, 1996).
WHITHER DUTCH CORPORATISM?
Or: A Turbulent Tango for Market and State
1. FROM DISEASE TO MIRACLE
1.1 Introduction
The performance of the Dutch labor market is an eye-catching meander along the trace set out by
international averages (see Figures 1 and 2). In the postwar period, up until the early 1970s, the
unemployment performance was superior. Then it shot up after 1973, leveled off for several years, and
exploded relative to the international mean in the late 1970s. This episode came to be known as the
“Dutch Disease.” But then, starting in the mid-1980s, came an exceptional recovery in terms of
unemployment reduction and employment growth. These developments attracted wide attention, and the
“Dutch Model,” or “Polder Model,” is sometimes presented as something of a miracle, a cure for the
disease of persistently high unemployment. Is there a Dutch Model? And if so, is it a reliable treatment
for troubled labor markets?
In the international arena, everyone is watching everyone else in the hope of detecting valuable
tricks, so this paper will serve as a little spy-mirror for watching the Netherlands. It will outline labor
market performance and offer a review of Dutch policies and the behavior of key players in the last two
decades. This will be done against the backdrop of a brief sketch of the historical development of the
Dutch economy. Obeying the laws of perspective that also reign in little mirrors, the present will be much
larger than the past, but of course cannot be disconnected from it. In the end, evaluating our results, we
will explore the questions of whether something like a “Dutch Model” exists and how much institutional
reform has taken place.
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1.2 Setting the Stage
An important structural Dutch feature is the consensus-oriented mode of operating in politics and
social relations. Some observers trace this even to the earliest history of Dutch society, where protecting
(and winning) land from water and floods created the oldest cooperative public bodies of government
(the waterboards, founded in the 12th and 13th centuries). Others link it to the particular modus vivendi
that emerged in a religiously divided country where no political party has a majority and coalition
governments are the only viable option. Under that modus, the late 19th century brought the development
of a system of political management in which strict ideological separatism at the bottom combines with
willingness to compromise at the top, to produce a fair degree of social and political stability. The
consensus orientation is clearly present in the institutions of the labor market that will be discussed
below, and that exhibit a remarkable continuity throughout the century.
In terms of economic development, the first postwar decades, until 1964, were characterized by
reconstruction and catching up. Right from the beginning, wages were a key variable of economic policy,
because of their pivotal role as a cost factor for an open economy that had to sell much of its product in
competitive world markets. From 1945 until 1954 there was government wage control, until 1959 there
were national wage guidelines, between 1959 and 1962 the guidelines permitted differentiation by
industry, and in 1963–1964 the system exploded. From 1945 to 1954, collective agreements were only
binding after approval of the Committee of Government Negotiators (with independent members, but
appointed by the government); the Committee always first asked advice from the Foundation of Labor.
The Foundation of Labor is a private organization, with half the seats for union federations, the other half
for employer organizations, and the chair rotating between them. Between 1954 and 1959, the wage
guidelines were no longer binding, but only set an upper limit. Between 1959 and 1962, differentiation
by industry became accepted—wages should follow the increase in the industry’s productivity. In 1963,5
the authority to approve (or reject) collective agreements shifted from the Foundation to the Social
Economic Council, a public organization, with the seats equally divided between union federations,
employer associations, and independent members appointed by the government; the chairman is
independent. In 1968, the system was formally abandoned, but effectively it had already broken down in
1963, when the rank-and-file translated the excess demand in the labor market (unemployment below 1
percent) into much higher wage demands than centrally agreed, and individual employers accepted. The
important point is that there is a tradition of consultation and bargaining at the central level, with wage
cost as a key variable, and with peak level organizations of workers and employers dealing with each
other and with the government. And there is a tradition of government intervention, interwoven in a
process of consultation and advice, not as bluntly imposed rulings. In the Foundation, social partners had
been jointly involved in setting the norm for the wage increases, which would then be imposed or
sanctioned by the government.
The decade of the 1960s, for the present purpose running from 1963 to 1973, was a period of
building up the welfare state at high speed. The share of taxes and social security premiums increased by
1 percentage point per year. Revenue from natural gas started to flow toward the government. It was also
the period of a very tight labor market; from 1960 to 1966 unemployment on average was below 1
percent. Yet, the first signs of structural change were also visible. After 1967, unemployment increased
and there are clear indications that the unemployment-vacancy curve shifted outward. Government
concern over wage cost never waned, and in 1970, the Law on Wage Formation was passed. It allowed
the Minister of Social Affairs to nullify wage agreements and to impose a temporary freeze on wage
increases (this right was removed in 1976). Resistance to that law from social partners has been quite
strong.
The oil price shock in 1973 definitely marked the end of the “golden era.” Unemployment
rapidly increased. The problems were initially tackled with Keynesian expansion policies, job creation6
programs, and investment subsidies, all aided by the government’s share in the gas revenue. The large
export of gas, however, also made for a strong external position, a high exchange rate, and large losses of
employment in the exposed sector. Government revenue from gas increased in a few years from 2.4 to
4.9 percent of the national income (it is now down to 0.5 percent). After 1975, the policy goals changed
toward budget deficit reduction and government retrenchment. However, the policy failed utterly. In a
period of 5 years, the government share in national income went up by 9 percentage points. This is the
period of “Dutch Disease”—exports curtailed by a strong guilder and government (transfer) programs
fueled by high gas revenues. Wages continued to increase (stimulated by the shifting of taxes and social
security premiums) and profits were squeezed. The wage share in market sector income increased to 92
percent. The government continued to stress the necessity of wage restraint, and actually intervened in
1974, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982 with mandates on wages: wage freezes, outlawing of automatic
cost-of-living adjustments, etc. The 1973–1982 period was one of muddling through with the
government’s fiscal policies, rapidly increasing unemployment, and intervention in wage formation that
increasingly irritated and frustrated social partners.
In hindsight, 1982 is usually cited as the turning point because it saw the Central Agreement
between the leading labor federation and the employers’ federation, struck in Wassenaar, and hence
dubbed the “Wassenaar Agreement.” The agreement included wage restraint and reduction in working
hours, intended to restore profit levels and create employment growth. At the same time, the government
became more determined to control its expenditures and its deficit, and to reform social security. In
particular, the flow into the disability pension had been incredibly high. More generally, and following
the mood in the rest of the world, there was a definite change from a Keynesian to a neoclassical, market-
based orientation. After 1982, consensus replaced antagonism in labor relations.
Why could this new start be made in 1982? There are several reasons. Perhaps the key is that
unemployment had skyrocketed in the early 1980s, creating a strong sense of urgency. Second, unions7
2More details are given in chapter 8 of Teulings and Hartog (1998) and in Freeman, Hartog, and Teulings
(1995).
and employers “were not amused” by the repeated government interventions in wage formation. The
government had intervened with six binding wage regulations of various sorts between 1974 and 1982;
they now had a strong desire to settle their affairs among themselves. And third, the whole institutional
structure had always been there to allow a return to the consensual nature of industrial relations that is
typical of the Dutch situation. A social agreement fits in the history and in the institutional and
sociocultural environment; it is by no means a social innovation. Centralized, corporatist decision-
making could resume its course. The Wassenaar Agreement has been updated and confirmed on several
occasions, as bi- or tripartite agreements, in 1989, 1993, and 1997. Other agreements concern early
retirement and labor market flexibility.
The program that was developed after 1982 has several components and several actors. It was not
formulated as some “Manifesto 1982,” but the goals were certainly around at the time, and so was the
sense of interrelatedness of the elements. The program consisted of the following components:
• The government was to get its expenditures under control: government retrenchment, with a
reduction in the burden of taxes and social security premiums.
• The social partners were to implement the Wassenaar Agreement: wage restraint, working time
reduction, more labor market flexibility.
• Social security was to be reformed.
Before considering this program in greater detail, we will sketch the Dutch institutional setting
and the way it works in the next section. The particular institutional environment (and history) has been
essential in allowing the policy mix that has been implemented.
28
3For discussion of the concept and various measures, see Teulings and Hartog (1998), chapter 1.
4Teulings and Hartog (1998) document that the higher the degree of corporatism in a labor market, the
smaller the magnitude of noncompetitive wage differentials, such as differentials associated with industry
affiliation, firm size, and collective bargaining regime. The authors also argue that there is certainly no evidence that
wage flexibility (a complicated concept to deal with, both theoretically and empirically) is higher in decentralized
than in corporatist settings. It might just as well be the other way around.
1.3 The System of Labor Relations
The Dutch labor market has strongly corporatist features. It is not easy to give a sharp definition
of corporatism, let alone measure it unequivocally, but its core elements are widely accepted.
3
Essentially, corporatism is a form of organization in which government and organized interests (mainly
trade unions and employer associations) jointly develop and implement social-economic policies. The
government does not operate at a distance and organized interests do not have to lobby; they are welcome
partners in the conference room. There is tripartite consultation at all stages of legislation and policy-
making. Often this is institutionalized in advisory bodies, but much coordination takes place in an
informal way. Organized interests are usually united in large federations or peak level organizations.
Bargaining over collective labor agreements is usually highly centralized. Quite often there is a strong
concern for equity issues and income policies. Austria and the Nordic countries are highly corporatist;
Germany is also rated as rather corporatist. Noncorporatist countries have very decentralized, firm-level
bargaining and no institutionalized consultation between government and organized interests. Examples
of noncorporatist countries are the United States and Canada, and in Europe, the United Kingdom.
4
The Dutch institutional setting is governed by two key laws on collective agreements. The 1927
Law on the Collective Agreement makes such an agreement binding for all workers in the firm, not just
members of the union who sign the agreement. Formally, it is possible to negotiate in the agreement that
contract terms only apply to union members. If this is done, it is not exclusively for a particular union but
applies to members of any union. Exclusive bargaining for union members only is never possible.9
5Some examples are the managers union De Unie and VHPP (Philips managers) signing a solo agreement
in 1996 with Philips when FNV and CNV demanded a 36-hour work week and the CNV breaking up the union
front by signing an agreement with NS (Dutch Railways). In April 1994, CNV signed an agreement with Heineken,
while FNV called out a strike (which they lost, after a blockade at the gate was ruled illegal in court).
Formally, the legal basis of labor relations allows free entry of new unions. Anyone can start a
union and ask for negotiations with an employer. The employer is free to honor or to ignore such a
request. Formally, he may choose to negotiate with one union and not with another, or he may use
different channels, like works councils. There are no formal representation rules, no compulsory
elections, no rules on bargaining or bargaining structures. Because of the 1927 Law on the Collective
Agreement, when an employer signs a contract with a single union, this contract automatically applies to
all its employees. Other unions are then left out. This happens infrequently, but when employers demand
concessions in harsh times, it sometimes occurs that one union agrees, and the others can only follow
suit, their protests notwithstanding.
5 The 1937 Law on Mandatory Extension states that if a collective
agreement covers a substantial majority of the industry, the Minister of Social Affairs can extend the
agreement to the entire industry, at the request of one of the signing parties.
In the Foundation of Labor, bargaining parties meet and consult each other, and give joint
recommendations to their members regarding wage restraint, training, and additional employment
policies. In some years, a Central Agreement has been negotiated within the Foundation of Labor. The
Wage Committee of the Foundation of Labor plays an important role in the system of labor relations.
Mandatory extension enables contracting partners to extend contracts in a large number of
industries. Only in retail and wholesale trade, where there are many small firms, is it difficult to satisfy
the requirement of a substantial majority of the workers to be bound directly. Instead, agreements
bargained in joint public bodies (PBOs) of employers and trade unions are imposed under the title of
rulings, without interference from the Ministry.10
In 1996, only 28 percent of workers were union members. Most unions belong to one of three
federations that are members of the Foundation of Labor (one with socialist and Catholic roots, one
Protestant, and one for white collar and management). Bargaining is mostly multiunion. On the
employer’s side is a large, broad-based general federation, one federation for small and medium-size
firms, and an agricultural association. Also, there is a large employer association that specializes in
services to individual employers, including bargaining for company agreements.
When there is a collective agreement in a firm, it does not necessarily imply that all employees
are covered. Top-level management is always excluded from the agreement. Furthermore, other
categories of workers may be excluded; for the most part, these are low-paid workers on temporary
employment. Most collective agreements are industry agreements, and the share is rising. In 1990, 82
percent of covered workers were covered by an industry agreement; this figure rose to 88 percent in
1997. The share of company agreements was 14 percent in 1975, climbing to 18 percent in 1990 and then
dropping to 12 percent in 1997. The number of workers covered by a nonextended industry contract has
been increasing, from 3 percent of covered workers to 10 percent. Coverage through mandatory extension
has been declining. Focusing just on the formal bargaining level would not do justice to the intricate
system of labor relations. The system has a remarkable balance with unions and union federations
playing an important role, precisely because their formal position is rather weak. Union density is less
than a quarter of the labor force and multiple unionism combined with the nondiscriminatory status of
collective agreements weakens the union side (an agreement signed with any union is binding for all
workers in the firm and possibly in the industry). Mandatory extension seems to give organized interests
a strong grip on their playing field, but the grip is different from a tight monopoly. The system operates
in a very flexible way and there are several escape routes (such as bargaining over the domain of an
agreement that is usually extended, or setting up a company agreement).11
The existence of escape routes and the potential vulnerability of established positions lead to
quite moderate results. There is no evidence that actual wages are substantially above market wages.
Econometric analysis shows that wage differentials between bargaining regimes are quite small, no more
than a few percent (Hartog, Leuven, and Teulings, 1997). The regime with mandatory extension does not
generate the highest wage levels; these are realized under company agreement. Collective bargaining
mostly sets minimum wage levels. If these were binding constraints, we should observe spikes in the
wage distribution at the level of the contract wage, but this does not happen. We only observe spikes in
cleaning and retail trade, but they occur at the level of the legal minimum wage. Many wages seem to
follow the pressure from market forces. For example, in construction, wages are determined “at the gate,”
when employers recruit for a going construction project. In wholesale trade, wages in the eastern part of
the Netherlands are quite close to the contract level, but in the western part wages are easily 10 to 15
percent higher. And representatives of unions and employers do not deny that payment below agreed
scales occurs if the market situation allows.
Freeman, Hartog, and Teulings (1995) conclude as follows on the Dutch system of wage
formation:
The essential characteristic of the system is the balancing act that the organisations of
workers and employers have to perform. They get a fair amount of background support
from the government, endorsing, extending and influencing the outcome of bargaining.
But the organisations have no monopoly, no legal exclusivity and they can only play
their role as long as workers, employers and member-organisations of the federations
are satisfied. Potentially, there are escape routes for the players in the game. The escape
routes are seldom used however, suggesting the system does not function as a
straightjacket on labour market participants.12
6Data in this section come from CPB, Centraal Economisch Plan, 1997, annexes.
7CBS, Statistisch Zakboek, 1992, Table 3.21, p. 114, and CBS, Statistisch Zakboek, 1998, Table 3.25,
p. 119.
2. IMPACT EFFECTS: GOVERNMENT BUDGET, WAGES, WORKING HOURS
How effective was “Manifesto 1982”?
2.1 Government Budget Control
6
The central government budget deficit was reduced from 8.9 percent of GDP in 1983 to 1.4
percent in 1996, the deficit of the total public sector (central government, local government, social
insurance) from 8.6 percent to 2.0 percent. The share of taxes and social security premiums was reduced
from 47.4 percent to 44.4 percent. The share of public expenditures in GDP fell from 58.0 percent to 46.9
percent. Employment volume in the public sector dropped from 698,000 person-years to 650,000, which
means a drop from 15 percent of employment volume to 11.7 percent. The national debt, at 63 percent of
national income in 1983, initially increased to about 81 percent in 1993 but then fell to 78 percent in
1996. The “wedge,” i.e., the difference between gross and net wages, as a percentage of gross wages, fell
from 34 percent at the level of the minimum wage to 21 percent in 1996, and at the wage level for the
“modal employee” (a specific Dutch definition for an employee with a wage at the lowest upper
boundary for compulsory social insurance) from 48 to 41 percent. At the lowest wage levels, there are
substantial rebates on social insurance contributions.
The reduction in the burden of the public sector is mostly accounted for by income transfers and
civil servant wages. Wage restraint in the public sector has been substantial. The index for contractual
wages, base 1980 = 100, stood at 155 for private sector workers in 1996, while for public sector workers
it stood at 123 (contract wage increases refer to the changes in scale wages; they are net of individual
wage changes related to tenure, experience, and other career effects).
7 Whereas in earlier days public
sector wages had been indexed to the private sector wage, a substantial gap was created in the first half of13
8Real wages were reduced by not adjusting for inflation. From 1980 to 1985, consumer prices increased by
21 percent (CBS, Statistisch Zakboek, 1987, Table U1, p. 329). Over the same period, nominal civil sector contract
wages per hour fell by 1.8 percent, per week/per month by 3.3 percent (Table V1, p. 337).
9CBS, Statistisch Zakboek, 1990, Table 11.9, p. 337, and CBS, Statistisch Zakboek, 1998, Table 11.12,
p. 387.
the 1980s. By 1983, public sector wages had dropped 2 percent, while private sector wages had increased
by 15 percent. By 1985, private sector wages climbed further to a 21 percent gain, while the public sector
wage stabilized. After 1985, contractual wages developed almost in parallel—the relative wage cut for
civil servants has been accomplished within just a few years.
8 As noted above, the share of employment
in the public sector fell substantially. This substantial decline in employment and relative wage has taken
place without major disruptive labor conflicts. This requires accommodating labor union behavior. As
everywhere, union density is relatively high in the public sector: 46 percent in 1985 versus 17 percent in
the private sector (Visser, 1990, Table 11, p. 50). Only 1982 had a relatively high incidence of strikes,
with 21/100,000 workdays lost; in other years, it is usually below 10 (CBS, Statistisch Zakboek). Public
sector unions are affiliated with the large federations and share the generally restrictive policies.
The reduction in expenditures on social security (transfers) is a pure price effect. From Table 2
(page 32) we can calculate that between 1980 and 1995, the number of benefit years increased from 2.2
million to 3.4 million, an increase of 52 percent. The average benefit per benefit year increased from Dfl
14,040 to Dfl 15,116, an increase by less than 8 percent, while over the same period national income per
inhabitant increased by 79 percent.
9
So, the conclusion on the relative reduction in government expenditures is clear. The bulk of the
cuts came from reduction in transfers and in the wage bill. For transfers, it is overwhelmingly a price
effect, as the number of recipients increased substantially. For the public sector wage bill, it is both a
price and a volume effect. Over the period 1983–1996, public sector employment fell by 7 percent. Over
the period 1980–1996, nominal public sector wages increased 30 percent less than private sector wages.
The relative wage reduction was mostly established in the early 1980s.14
2.2 Wage Restraint
Nominal wage increases after 1983 have been modest, with a peak of 4 percent in 1992; in most
years, the increase has been less than 2 percent. Figure 3 gives the index of contract wages in the private
and public sectors. Note that real market wages were stable between 1975 and 1979, then decreased, and
stabilized again after 1981. Hence, the Wassenaar Agreement was not the beginning of wage
restraint—rapidly increasing unemployment during the 1970s had already triggered moderation. As
Figure 4 shows, unit wage cost in 1996 was at the same level as in 1981. Over the same period, it
increased by 40 percent in Germany and by 15 percent on average in the European Union (EU). The
wage share in market sector income dropped from 93 percent in 1987 to 82 percent in 1997.
At the low end of the wage distribution, restraint was even stronger. The adult legal minimum
wage, in real terms, was reduced by 20 percent in less than 20 years. The legal minimum wage is
differentiated by age. In 1979, half of the minimum wage population was on the minimum youth wage; in
1994 the figure had dropped to a third (Salverda, 1997a). The minimum youth wage declined even more
than the adult minimum; this is reflected in the graph for the weighted minimum, i.e., weighted by the
age category’s employment share in 1979. The share of employment yielding no more than the legal
minimum wage dropped from 7.9 percent in 1979 to 2.6 percent in 1994 (in full-time equivalents). In
1979, the legal adult minimum wage was 70 percent of the median wage. The share of employment at or
below that relative wage level was 12.4 percent in 1979 and had climbed to 14.0 in 1994 (Salverda,
1997a). In other words, the share of workers at the minimum wage has declined substantially. But since
the minimum wage itself has dropped below its former relative level, the share of workers in the low-
wage tail defined by the initial relative level has increased.
2.3 Working Time Reduction
Actual hours worked per year dropped to the lowest level in Europe: 1,452 hours in 1993, while
the average in the EU stood at 1,669, and Germans worked 1,592 hours. This is due mainly to part-timeFIGURE 3
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work. Average annual hours for full-time workers are about equal: 1,788 in the Netherlands, 1,797 in the
EU. Great Britain is the exception here, with an average of 1,953 annual hours. Dutch part-timers work
less (817 annual hours versus 921 in the EU), and there are relatively more of them. There clearly has
been a substitution of persons for hours. Total hours worked per annum by the total labor force in 1990
were equal to the total in 1970 (Den Butter and van Vuuren, 1997). In 1975, all full-time workers had a
standard 40-hour work week. In 1998, the average work week for a full-timer was about 36 hours
(Plantenga and Dur, 1998).
Table 1 portrays the shift in employment composition for 1987 and 1995, two cyclically
comparable years (the unemployment rates in both years were virtually equal). For both men and women,
annual contractual hours declined. Overtime hours increased, as could be anticipated from the relative
increase in fixed cost when contractual hours decline. Part-time work and flexible contract work
increased. The share of full-time male work diminished from 66 to 60 percent of the annual employment
volume. The total of full-time work, for men and women together, decreased from 83 to 75 percent. The
share of women increased from 29 to just under 33 percent, with a big increase in the share of part-time
female work. Part-time work increased from 13 to 19 percent, and flexible contract work increased only
modestly from 4 to 5 percent.
Part-time work covers all jobs in which the agreed hours of work are less than the full-time
contractual hours of the firm. Over three-quarters of the volume of part-time work is done by women; for
the most part it appears in line with preferences. The labor force participation rate for women has
increased steadily (from 40 percent in 1987 to 49.9 percent in 1996), and many women like to work part-
time. Given the social and institutional environment, there are no signs that those working part-time want
to supply more hours. The relation between women’s labor supply behavior and child care facilities in
the Netherlands is not well established. Provision of day care facilities by employers is not common. Use
of informal child care (friends, relatives, neighbors) is more common than use of formal facilities amongTABLE 1
Changes in Number of Jobs (Thousands) by Contract and Industry, 1987–1995
                                   Men                                                                    Women                                
Full Part Flex Total Full Part Flex Total
Agriculture 3 2 7 12 1 3 9 12
Mining 0 . . -1 0 . . 0
Manufacturing -73 19 -2 -47 1 18 8 27
Energy and water -5 0 -1 -5 0 2 . 1
C o n s t r u c t i o n - 4467 0- 132
Trade 64 24 20 107 22 54 27 103
Hotels, restaurants 8 17 12 38 2 32 19 52
Transport, communication -3 9 6 12 8 15 7 30
Finance 3 2 -1 3 -2 10 1 8
Business service 82 14 33 129 32 52 46 131
Public administration -80 10 4 -65 1 22 2 25
Education -7 9 -5 -4 -9 27 0 17
Health and welfare -4 23 5 24 -57 148 40 132
Culture 13 9 -6 16 2 19 11 33
H o u s e h o l d  s e r v i c e .000 .1 7 . 1 3
Total -6 143 77 215 0 417 170 587
Source: CBS, Arbeidsrekeningen (Labor Accounts), various years.19
women with and without paid employment. In fact, among women using child care facilities, the
differences by types of care between women with and without paid employment are modest. The effect of
the price of the child care facility on leisure demand has been estimated as zero (Maassen van den Brink,
1994; Maassen van den Brink and Groot, 1994). Perhaps availability of facilities is relevant for labor
supply, but given the high probability that at least informal facilities are available, it is hard to conclude
that lack of facilities is the key factor in explaining the high incidence of part-time work among women.
The reduction in contractual hours after 1982 did not stem from demands by the workers. The
earlier reductions had been increases in demand for leisure induced by increases in the wage rate—an
income effect dominating the substitution effect. After 1982, the stimulus came from union leadership,
and workers only reluctantly accepted. With constant or even declining real wages, they were not
interested in buying more leisure. More recently, however, surveys indicate an interest in a shorter work
week, among both men and women (Plantenga and Dur, 1998).
Labor supply has also been reduced by a sharp drop in the participation of older men. They
received a disability pension, benefitted from early retirement schemes, or, when long-term unemployed,
were exempted from the obligation to search for a job. In 1996, only 39 percent of men aged 55 to 65 had
paid work. Among women, this figure was 13 percent (CTSV, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen,
1997). The financial cost to the individual pensioner was usually very low. There were private sector
supplements for workers older than 57.5 to their unemployment benefits. In 1975, unemployed persons
over 60 became eligible for unemployment benefits until age 65 without the requirement of active job
search and involuntary layoff (which implied benefit entitlement from the age of 57.5 until national
pension entitlement at 65). Optional early retirement schemes started to emerge after 1976, organized at
the level of firms and industries (Teulings, van der Veen, and Trommel, 1997, p. 31).20
2.4 Effectiveness
Government policy consisted of reducing expenditures by reducing the public sector wage bill,
reducing transfers, and lowering the legal minimum wage. Although the initial impact of such policy
must be negative, the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) used a simulation showing that the ultimate effects
were positive. The CPB compared the actual situation in 1990 with the predicted outcome under
alternative policies (CPB, 1991). The econometric model has a wage equation in which wage growth
responds to prices, unemployment, the burden of taxes and social security premiums, and the net
replacement rate. Investment responds to the share of wages in national income. Before the policy
interventions, public sector wages, social security benefits, and the legal minimum wage were indexed to
the private sector wage. Had this indexation continued (at budget deficit as actually realized, hence at
higher taxes), private sector employment in years would have been lower by 125,000 (by 150,000 in
persons) and unemployment would have been higher by 105,000 persons. Between 1979 and 1990, the
share of value added labor income in the private sector decreased by 10 percentage points. In the CPB
calculations, three-quarters of this decrease was due to the endogenous effect of higher unemployment.
Had wages increased to maintain the private sector labor share at the level of 1979, private sector
employment in years would have been lower by 220,000 and unemployment in persons would have been
higher by 275,000 (actual unemployment in 1990 was 419,000). Had both indexation and constant labor
share wage development occurred, predicted private sector employment in 1990 would have been 8
percent lower than actually observed. Had indexation continued, real national income would have been
lower. Had wage development maintained the labor share in income, real national income would have
been higher. The contribution of world trade growth to employment growth and unemployment was
estimated to be very modest.21
10See Calmfors (1985) for an early analysis. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) argue that working hours
have no effect on the unemployment rate. They cite an OECD wage equation for 19 countries (and 30 years) in
which the effect of average weekly hours on wages is insignificant. With wage pressure unaffected, equilibrium
unemployment is also unaffected in their model. Their “casual” analysis of plotting the decrease in working hours
against the increase in unemployment in 11 countries for the period 1975–1988 even shows a perverse relation, but
De Regt (1997), plotting observations for cyclically comparable years 1983 and 1993 (both troughs of the cycles),
exactly reverses the relation! Plotting changes over the years 1979–1989, both more or less cyclical peaks, restores
the relation as found by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman.
How effective has work sharing been for creating additional employment? Most economic
analyses are skeptical.
10 Dur (1997) estimates that for the Netherlands, 1966–1993, annual wage cost
decreases by 0.6 percent if contractual hours are reduced by 1 percent, implying an increase in the hourly
wage of 0.4 percent. De Regt (1997) reports that hourly wages are constant if working hours are reduced.
Dur (1996) estimates a four-equation model: employment, unemployment share of long-term
unemployed, real hourly wages, and labor supply, for the period 1969–1994. Employment in hours
(annual employment in labor years multiplied by contractual annual hours) is not significantly affected
by contractual hours. This suggests proportionality for work sharing at given hourly wage cost and at
given total employment, i.e., equivalence of persons and hours. Work sharing thus has the potential of
reducing unemployment. But real hourly wages (including employer premiums for social security)
respond significantly to contractual hours, with an elasticity of ￿0.8: a reduction of contractual hours by
1 percent increases hourly wage cost by 0.8 percent. Since wages affect employment with an elasticity of
￿0.5, there is a negative effect of work sharing on employment through cost increases. Labor supply
responds significantly to wages and unemployment, positively to the former, negatively to the latter.
Wage effects and labor supply effects take away much of the proportionality effect of work sharing—less
than 20 percent of the proportional effect on unemployment remains. This is due to a primary effect of
wages on employment, cutting directly into the proportionality, and to secondary effects, as reduced
unemployment increases wages and labor supply. Work sharing indeed reduces unemployment, but at a
high cost in terms of employment and output. In Dur’s decomposition of the unemployment history22
11In banking, reduction of the standard week to 36 hours (in 1995) was combined with an extension of the
hours that banks are open to the public. A large retail firm moved to a 35-hour work week and a 60-hour operational
week, also extending open hours (restrictions on open hours of retail stores have recently been lifted). A large
chemical company introduced an average work week of 36 hours, with the company determining the timing of 50
percent of 23 days of annual leave and the possibility for the worker to sell some of these days for work (Plantenga
and Dur, 1998).
between 1970 and 1994, unemployment was strongly pushed upward by population growth. Reduction in
contractual hours had a substantial mitigating effect between 1970 and 1989. Negotiated reduction in
working time in collective agreements mostly took place in two periods: by 8 percent in 1970–1975 and
by 6 percent in 1980–1985. During the 1990s, the effect has been negligible (Plantenga and Dur, 1998).
Kapteyn, Zaidi, and Kalwij (1997) try to assess the effect of work sharing from an international
comparison but fail to identify many significant effects. In particular, working hours have no effect on
employment, unemployment, wages, labor supply, or GDP per capita. This suggests that work sharing is
both useless and harmless: no effect on the target variables (employment, unemployment) and no cost
effect (GDP per capita).
Clearly, there is no strong empirical support for a policy of worksharing as a method to reduce
unemployment. CPB (1991) also finds a very modest effect. It may have had some effect in the
Netherlands, but at a cost to the volume of employment. An important issue, not studied in the
econometric analyses, is the decision on the timing of working hours. It will matter a great deal whether
standard weekly hours are rigidly reduced, or only reduced on average, and it will also matter whether
workers can take time off at will or whether employers can decide when a worker should take additional
days off. A survey covering the period 1982–1985 found that in half the firms, reduced working hours
per employee resulted in reduced operating hours of the firm, while in the other half, operating hours
were maintained (CPB, 1991, p. 10). Several recent collective agreements in the Netherlands attempt to
combine reduced standard hours with increased flexibility, with a say for employers on the timing of
work and leisure.
11 If additional leisure can be taken during slack times, the effect on wage cost is23
12Details of the social security system are given in an appendix to the ILO report.
reduced, but so is the effect on labor demand. Indeed, authority over the spacing of working time seems
quite important for the effects.
3. SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
3.1 The Reforms
The period of constructing and expanding the welfare state lasted until the late 1960s. From then
until the mid-1980s, the period for which the term “Dutch Disease” was coined, the welfare state
provided a comfortable safety net, with generous benefit levels for sickness (100 percent or more!),
unemployment, and disability, and rather easy access. But halfway through the 1980s, reforms got under
way, with 1987 marking a watershed.
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Until the reforms in 1995, the organization of social security was distinctly corporatist.
Eligibility, benefit level, and benefit duration are specified by law. But implementation, administration,
and control were in the hands of social partners through their position in Industry Associations, created
by law in 1953 precisely for this purpose. The 18 Industry Associations (26 initially) were governed by
the organizations of employers and employees. The social partners had a strong grip on operating
unemployment, sickness, and disability insurance programs. For example, they jointly decided on
disputed insurance benefit claims in a Disputed Claims Commission. Until 1994, social partners even
controlled supervision of the Associations, because they had a joint majority in the supervisory Social
Insurance Council. The Social Insurance Council consisted of union and employers’ representatives and
independent members appointed by the Minister of Social Affairs (eight members for each category)
under a chairman appointed by the government. The same applies to national insurance (old age and24
13Of course, the product price of the industry’s output may increase. But the population of beneficiaries
was the same as the population that pays the premiums.
widow[er] pensions), where the Social Insurance Bank with tripartite governance administers the
insurance and sets the premiums.
In all cases, social partners had a strong hand in setting premiums. The premiums for sickness
insurance were set by the Industry Associations and, hence, differed by Association. The premium for
disability insurance was set by the Social Insurance Council, where partners had a (two-thirds) majority.
The premium did not fluctuate across Associations, but was uniform across the labor force.
Unemployment insurance had a mixed structure. Part of the premium was uniform across the labor force,
set by the Unemployment Fund, with tripartite governance. Another part (on average, about one-tenth of
the total premium) was set by the Industry Associations and hence was industry-specific. The industry-
specific part related to the first stages of unemployment, i.e., the first 8 weeks (later extended to 26
weeks). Considered from the perspective of the decision-makers at the industry level, there was no scope
for shifting the burden of generous policies in the sickness insurance to outsiders (premiums were
specific for the Industry Association).
13 There was, however, full scope in case of disability insurance
(because of the undifferentiated, national premium) and some scope in case of unemployment insurance.
During the 1980s, when unemployment had risen dramatically and a large share of the population
received social security benefits, attempts to reduce expenditures aimed at three targets: the employee (to
make benefit regimes less appealing), the employer (to confront him with the cost of referral to a
program), and the controlling and supervising organizations (to create a self-governing system more
conducive to sober and efficient utilization).
Tracing the history of social security reform is close to a nightmare. Regulations are complex,
legislated changes in the mandatory components are often countered by adjustment in collective
bargaining (e.g., supplementing legal benefit entitlements), and the process of reform has created many25
exceptions and transitional provisions. It is simply misleading to characterize the full system by an
average replacement rate and an average duration entitlement. Properly assessing the impact of the
system and its changes is even more complicated. Still, it is immediately clear that reforms have not been
very effective because the population of benefit recipients is still very high.
The reform on the employee side meant first of all a reduction of benefit ratios. In the period
1985–1987, the basic replacement ratio for unemployment, sickness, and disability was lowered from 80
percent to 70 percent. For each of these insurance programs, eligibility rules were also tightened.
The incidence of sickness increased sharply from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. Until 1985,
the national sickness insurance paid 80 percent of the wage during the sickness, starting at day 3 of a
sickness interval, for a maximum of one year (after which transition to the disability program was
considered). Premiums were differentiated by industry (for 18 Industry Associations). Through collective
agreements, the benefits were raised to 100 percent, from the first day of sickness, at the expense of the
employer. In 1985, the benefit level was lowered to 75 percent, in 1986 to 70 percent, but again
collective agreements safeguarded the workers by simply adjusting the employer supplements (Teulings,
van der Veen, and Trommel, 1997, p. 287). There was thus no financial loss for sick employees and until
1985 often even gains in net income, as sickness benefits were exempt from social insurance premiums.
It is quite likely that the strong increase in sickness incidence was due to the combination of full income
coverage and a very lenient system of monitoring (for which there is ample anecdotal evidence). In the
reform of 1994, employers were mandated to pay at least 70 percent of the wages for the first 6 weeks of
sickness (2 weeks for small employers), with the option for employers to seek private insurance. In 1996,
this was extended to full employer liability for 70 percent of the wages for one year. Essentially, the
sickness insurance program for employees has been privatized.
Just looking at the available time series for sickness incidence shows that between 1993 and
1995, the sickness absence rate fell markedly. Since then, it appears to have stabilized. On the face of it,26
14Teulings, van der Veen, and Trommel (1997, pp. 79–80) document how firms have adjusted with active
prevention policies.
15Collective labor agreements sometimes contained provisions to reduce absenteeism related to sickness.
without conditioning on external factors, the extension of employer liability from 6 weeks to one year
does not seem to have had much of an impact, while the first step (liability for the first 6 weeks) is
associated with a substantial drop in sickness rates. However, the sickness absence rate in the public
sector also fell, from 6.3 percent in 1993 to 5.6 percent in 1994. In 1995, it increased again to 5.8 percent
(CBS, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek, May 1996, p. 14). If we use the public sector sickness rate
as a crude index for external conditions, the indexed private sector rate would have been 5.5 percent in
1994 and 6.3 percent in 1995. That would imply a drop of sickness incidence by 11 percent in 1994 and
another 11 percent drop in 1995, giving a total reduction due to privatization of 22 percent.
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But conclusions should not be drawn too easily. Sickness absenteeism policies had already been
on the agenda for collective bargaining before privatization was enacted.
15 The result has been more
attention to the quality of working conditions and more frequent and earlier checks by physicians.
Sickness leave compensation as a percentage of the wage bill increased from 2 percent in the early 1950s
to almost 7 percent in the late 1970s. It declined toward 5 percent in the late 1980s and then rose again
before the privatization dip occurred (CTSV, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen, 1997, Figure 4.2.b,
p. 67). It had always been possible to opt out of the collective insurance system at the industry level and
as a firm to either fully absorb the risk or set up insurance under joint governance of employer and
employees. In terms of total benefits paid, the latter two groups initially were about half the size of the
collective insurance system, but the share gradually dropped to about a quarter (before returning to one-
half when the privatization reforms started). The incidence of absence due to sickness (measured by
benefits paid relative to the wage bill) appears quite similar for the different systems (CTSV, Kroniek,
1997, Figure 4.1.b, p. 65). This might suggest that the type of organization of the insurance is immaterial27
as long as the insurance contract (level of benefits paid, intensity of monitoring, etc.) is not affected.
More solid comparisons are not available, however.
The privatization of sickness leave compensation (and the attention already paid to the high
absence rates before the privatization took hold) does appear to have changed the policies of employers
and insurance associations. More intensive monitoring and more active prevention policies have been
instituted. In 1996, under full privatization, five of ten firms paid less than 100 percent as sickness
benefit, and four of ten paid 70 percent. Before privatization, compensation at 100 percent was the rule.
There are also indications that firms are more selective in hiring and that they evaluate absenteeism
indicators in their hiring decision (CTSV, 1997, pp. 53–60).
In conclusion, the sickness incidence rate, after a long climb to a high plateau maintained
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, has come down in reaction to privatization and a set of
policies leading to lower financial compensation, more intense monitoring, and more active prevention
policies. The downside, however, is more selective hiring decisions by firms.
The most worrisome development in the Netherlands, and a painful claim to international
notoriety, has been the explosion in the number of disability benefit recipients. This has been caused by a
combination of a generous benefit scheme, generous and fuzzy eligibility criteria, and a governance
structure that is not conducive to restraint. Disability insurance was enacted in 1967. Individuals were
placed in disability intervals, with a disability of 80 to 100 percent giving entitlement to the full benefit
of 80 percent of lost earnings. Disability was determined with reference to the wage that could be earned
for the incapacitated worker’s education and experience, taking into account the situation in the labor
market. This condition implies that disability became explicitly related to the level of unemployment—if
the state of the labor market would make it hard to find a job for the remaining capacity to work, the
disabled worker would be placed in a higher disability interval. The inflow into disability was massive28
and dramatic, and clearly responsive to economic incentives (Aarts and de Jong, 1992). It has extensively
and convincingly been argued that the disabled population contains a large component of unemployment.
In 1987, the benefit level was lowered to 70 percent. However, it stimulated the provision of
supplementary benefits through collective agreements, from applying to 68 percent of employees in 1984
to 88 percent in 1989 (Teulings, van der Veen, and Trommel, 1997, p. 286). Also, the “labor market
criterion” was abolished. In 1993, eligibility conditions were tightened. The disability had to be a direct
consequence of the impairment, by objective standards, and the remaining earnings capacity came to be
estimated from a selection of the best-paying jobs that would be open to the individual. Also in 1993, the
principle of constant benefit levels until age 65 was abandoned. The benefit level came to be related to
age and work experience. Recipients younger than 50 were subjected to new medical examinations, in
successive cohorts. Half of the new examinations for “cohort 94” (recipients younger than 35) led to
lower disability levels and hence to lower benefit levels; in 37 percent of the cases, the benefit was even
ended altogether. For “cohort 95” (recipients between 35 and 40), 35 percent got a lower estimate (of
which 18 percent saw their benefit ended) (CTSV, 1995, pp. 50–51).
The percentage of workers on disability increased to a high of 13.5 percent in 1984 and then
slowly declined to 9.7 percent in 1996. In equivalence years, correcting for the degree of disability, there
was a peak of 568,000 years (for employees) in 1992 and 1993, and then a decline to 509,000 years in
1996. During the 1990s the inflow rate seems to have responded to the policy measures with a structural
decrease. The outflow rate has clearly gone up, from 8.2 percent in 1990 to 12.2 percent in 1994. In that
year, for the first time since the introduction of the law, the outflow surpassed the inflow. However, in
1996, the tide turned again. On the face of it, the reforms show no lasting effect on the size of the
disability population. The reform of 1987, in particular the elimination of the labor market situation from
the disability criterion, appears to have had no effect either. Econometric analyses of inflow into
disability before 1987 showed a considerable impact of the situation on the labor market, and one study29
using postreform data showed a much smaller impact, suggesting the change may have had an impact
(Stigter, 1997, p. 15). However, Teulings, van der Veen, and Trommel (1997, p. 80) report that after
1987, the labor market situation remained influential for examiners’ decisions, in particular for older
men. And the time series does not show signs of a marked effect. What did change, however, was the
share of partial disability—the gradual increase of this share after 1977 steepened after 1986 and after
1990.
Among the three lines of attack on the expanded welfare state distinguished above, the second is
targeted at employers. The changes have already been mentioned above. In 1994, employers became
directly liable for wages of sick employees in the first 6 weeks (or first 2 weeks for small employers). In
1996 this 6-week period was extended to a full year. The employer is held responsible for a policy to
reduce sickness absenteeism (which includes the obligation to consult expert advice) and is under
obligation to monitor a worker’s inability to work. Between 1992 and 1994, the disability insurance had a
bonus-malus system: a penalty for every employee of the firm who became disabled, a premium for
hiring a disabled person. Since January 1998, the firm’s premium for disability insurance includes an
experience rating. There is an obligation for firms to consult a Working Conditions service (“Arbo
dienst”) to improve working conditions and prevent the incidence of disease and disability.
The third line of attack is focused on the organizational structure. Unemployment, sickness, and
disability insurance used to be administered by the Industry Associations and supervised by the Social
Insurance Council, and social partners dominated administration and operative control. In 1995 the
Council was discontinued and supervision was handed over to the Commission for Supervising Social
Insurances, CTSV. This is an independent body, without participation from social partners. It oversees
the Industry Associations and initially the temporary committee for coordinating the Associations’
policies, TICA. In the same year, the public Joint Medical Service GMD was abolished. It used to do the
medical inspections for disability claims. In 1997, both TICA and all the Industry Associations were30
16Debates on the management structure and organization of the social insurance programs have a long
history. See Teulings, van der Veen, and Trommel (1997, chapter 9) for discussion and further references.
abolished. Administration of employee insurance, disability insurance, and the Income Supplement Act is
now the responsibility of the National Institute for Social Insurances, LISV, which contracts out to five
Executive Institutes, UVIs, organized by (clusters of) industries. LISV is supervised by CTSV. Thus,
social partners have lost their operational control over social insurance programs.
There is a widespread view that social partners were responsible for the dramatic expansion of
the population on disability benefit, a view underscored by an extensive parliamentary investigation.
Social partners have been punished for their mismanagement by the drastic administrative reform. In the
old system, until 1995, social partners administered disability and part of the unemployment benefits
through their role in the Industry Associations. In the supervisory body, they had a joint majority over the
independent members. After 1997, when the Industry Associations were abolished, they are no longer
involved in administration or supervision. This is an important move away from the former intentionally
corporatist organization set up in the early 1950s.
16 The dust has not settled, however, and the new
organzation is still under construction. A key issue is the precise mix of public and private elements. We
will return to this question below.
3.2 Effectiveness of the Reforms
What is the upshot of all these reforms?
For an overview of what happened during a decade and a half of discussions and policy changes,
we compare 1980, 1986, and 1995 (1986 is the last year before serious reforms in social security got
under way). We consider four categories: sickness benefits, disability benefits, and unemployment
benefits, with the latter grouped in two subcategories—the standard unemployment benefits from
entitlement under the WW, the unemployment benefit act, which covers the first 6 months of31
17Taking percentages, it fell from 5.7 to 4.6 percent, but note that the labor force is not in full-time
equivalents. The labor force was taken from CTSV, Kroniek, 1997, Table 3.3.
unemployment, and other unemployment. Other unemployment covers all these special provisions, under
such headings as unemployment provision, general assistance, etc.
Even admitting the crudity of the picture generated by Table 2, it certainly does not impress an
observer as a splendid success story. Indeed, the size of the labor force increased, from 5.344 million in
1980 to 5.955 million in 1986 and to 6.596 million in 1996. The incidence of sickness is at the same level
as 1980 and, hence, relative to the labor force has clearly diminished.
17 The other categories have
increased substantially, in particular unemployment. The cost per recipient year has increased for
sickness and disability and decreased for the unemployed. Cost and incidence of sickness have developed
favorably; disability and unemployment recipiency have increased strongly.
Figure 5 illustrates the development of the relative social minimum over 25 years: from two-
thirds of the average wage in the early 1970s to over 80 percent between 1975 and 1983, and then
gradually back to two-thirds. The social minimum is the guaranteed minimum income, either as minimum
wage or minimum benefit in combination with income supplements. The increase in the relative benefit
level has made benefit status more attractive relative to work. Wolfe et al. (1984) estimate that the 21
percent increase in benefits between 1974 and 1980 has reduced average hours worked by 17 percent of
the 1980 level, i.e., an annual decrease of 2.7 percent. Teulings, van der Veen, and Trommel (1997,
chapter 6) apply some “guestimated” elasticities and hold the high benefit level between 1974 and 1985
responsible for an upper level of 100,000 additional unemployed.
The social minimum puts a floor in the market, and this affects the reservation wage at the low
end of the distribution. This may be a factor in explaining why rising unemployment has not put more
pressure on low wages. From the data in Hartog, Oosterbeek, and Teulings (1993), we may deduce that
between 1979 and 1985 the relative wage of unskilled labor increased by 11 percent and then stabilized32
TABLE 2
Transfers for Inactivity
 Beneficiary Years (x 1,000)        Benefit/Recipient Year     
1980 1986 1995 1980 1986 1995
Sickness 306 271 306 24392 28081 28183
Disability 608 713 752 22808 23272 28370
Unemployment
WW 69 73 341 34014 38767 31320
Other 1273 1793 1983 6282 8559 5615
Sources:
Beneficiary Years: SZW, Sociale Nota, 1998, Annex 11.
Sickness: Table 11A.6 ( Ziektewet)
Disability: Table 11A.7 (WAO, AAW)
Unemployment WW: Table 11A.9 (WW)
Unemployment, Other: Table 11B.1 (WWV) + Table 11B.2 (IOAW) + Table 11B.6 (JWG)
           + Table 11B.7 (Banenpools) + Table 11B.8 (BKR) + Table 11B.17.B (Bijstand 
     Rijksgroepsregelingen) + Table 11B.17A.1 (Bijstand, niet Rijksgroepsregeling, onder 65)
Benefit/Recipient Years = total expenditures/beneficiary years, in guilders 
Expenditures: SZW, Sociale Nota, 1998, Annex 13 
Sickness: Table 13A.A (loonderving door ziekte) 
Disability: Table 13A.A (arbeidsongeschiktheid) 
Unemployment WW: Table 13A.A (werkloosheid) 
Unemployment, Other: Table13A.B (werkloosheid + bijstand exclusief RWW + BKR)Figure 5
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18In a standard Mincer earnings equation, the rate of return was 0.089 in 1979, 0.072 in 1985, and 0.073 in
1989. We assume an unskilled worker has 4 years of education after primary school (to conform to the legal
minimum) and a more-educated worker has 7 years. The relative wage rate then changes by 4 * (0.072 ￿ 0.089) =
￿0.119.
until 1989.
18 The effect of this increase on labor demand of the unskilled, from substituting higher-skilled
for unskilled workers, depends on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution by skill level. With an
elasticity of substitution of 1, the employment ratio would drop by 11 percent. At an original share of
low-skill labor of 0.5 in 1979 (lower education plus extended lower), this would come down to a drop in
demand for unskilled labor by 5.5 percent of total employment. Related to the labor force of about 4.5
million person-years in the 1980s, this would amount to a reduction in demand for the unskilled of some
250,000 person-years. Between 1978 and 1985, the number of unemployment benefit recipients increased
by some 400,000.
During the first half of the 1990s, outflow rates from unemployment benefits to work were still
not high. During that time, 53 percent of those on unemployment benefit (WW) for a year or less found a
job, as did 30 percent of those on benefit for 1 to 2 years and 22 percent of those on benefit for 2 to 3
years. For those on general assistance (ABW), these rates were much lower (16, 13, and 9 percent)
(SZW, Sociale Nota, 1998, Annex 17). Among registered unemployed in 1996, almost a quarter had been
unemployed for more than 3 years (102,000 out 441,000) and one-half had been unemployed for more
than a year. In 1988, with registered unemployment at 453,000, the division by duration was virtually
identical. (SZW, Sociale Nota, 1998, Annex 4).
Why have the reforms and the reductions in benefit levels during the 1980s and 1990s been so
ineffective? One factor may be that replacement ratios at the bottom have not really diminished. The ratio
between minimum benefit and legal minimum wage stood at 98.5 in 1983 and at 98.1 in 1997 and has
barely fluctuated in the intervening years (CPB, 1997, Centraal Economisch Plan 1997, Annex A6).
While the relative social minimum has declined substantially over time, there is no evidence that work35
incentives for the unemployed at the minimum level have improved. In fact, the financial incentives for
return to the labor market, from a benefit situation, are generally weak. Only single individuals would
experience a substantial income increase by exiting from unemployment. In the case of a married worker
formerly employed at the level of the minimum wage, returning to a minimum wage job would yield an
income increase of 1 percent. Returning to a job at the same wage level as before, at 125 percent of the
legal minimum wage, increases income by 17 percent relative to the unemployment benefit. However,
taking a job for one day a week would in this case boost income by 8 percent. Thus to gain 9 percent in
income, 4 days of leisure per week have to be sacrificed (Groot, Hartog, and Pott-Buter, 1992, p. 85).
And this even ignores the cost of work, such as travel, clothes, etc. These calculations were made for
1992, but it is doubtful whether much has changed since then. In a detailed study, Engbersen, Schuyt, and
Timmer (1990) established that many long-time unemployed are resigned to their situation and are
reasonably satisfied. They may participate in volunteer work and in the underground economy, but they
have given up all efforts to search for work. On top of the lack of incentives for individuals, it has also
been observed that Dutch expenditures long favored passive policies relative to active policies, in
comparison with other countries (Groot, Hartog, and Pott-Buter, 1992).
It is hard to say whether the other reforms (tighter eligibility rules, increased sanctions,
curtailment of duration) have had much of an impact. In general the relation between unemployment
duration and level and duration of benefits is not firmly established. Many studies find no relation at all
or, at best, only a small effect. However, studies on unemployment benefit systems often ignore the fine
details of the system (cf. Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991), and the Dutch system has many fine details.
For the Netherlands, effects have been established for specific elements such as approaching the end of
benefit entitlement (Lindeboom, 1992; Van den Berg, 1990) and sanctions applied to insufficient job-
finding efforts (Abbring, 1997). Between 1987 and 1994, the number of sanctions has increased fourfold,
to 17 percent of the inflow of unemployed; sanctions may substantially influence the probability of36
outflow to work, depending on gender, age, and wage (Teulings, van der Veen, and Trommel, 1997, p.
166). But careful econometric evaluations of the system overhaul are barely available.
Summarizing developments over the last 15 to 20 years, we may say that the increase in
generosity of social insurance and social security has created a large volume of benefit recipients. The
high social minimum may have been a factor in eliminating low-skill jobs, as the high reservation wage
at the low end kept wages high and stimulated substitution of higher-educated for less-educated workers.
Reducing the high volume of benefit recipients has proved extremely difficult. In fact, only the reduction
in sickness incidence in the most recent years may qualify as a success. Apparently, the reservation wage
of the benefit recipients was higher than what employers wanted to pay for their qualifications.
4. FLOWS AND FLEXIBILITY
4.1 Changes in the Market Structure for Flow Management
“Flexibilization” of the labor market has been an essential part of the post-1982 program.
Flexibility is a broad concept, without a straightforward standard definition. It refers in general to the
ease of adjustment of worker allocation and worker efforts to changes in external conditions. It assigns an
important position to flows in the labor market and between the labor market and benefit recipient status.
The nature of the employment contract is often seen as very influential for a number of these flows. From
that perspective the development in the Netherlands has indeed been remarkable. The growth in the
volume of employment (in person-years) between 1983 and 1996 has almost fully been realized by “flex-
workers” and part-timers. In fact, from 1970 until 1996 the volume of full-time jobs has been stable at
about 3.7 million.
It is important to realize that not all flex-workers can be summoned to work just when and where
the employer decides. The category of flex-workers covers workers on call and with otherwise flexible
arrangements, workers hired through a temporary-work agency, and workers with a contract for less than37
one year. In 1996, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Labor Accounts, just over one-half
of all jobs were tenured full-time jobs, one-quarter were tenured part-time jobs, one-tenth were flexible
jobs, and one-eighth were self-employed positions. From 1970 to 1996, the number of part-time jobs
increased from 600,000 to 1.8 million, and the number of flexible jobs increased from 200,000 to
700,000. However, the Labor Force Survey EBB, presumably the source for the CBS Labor Accounts,
does not cover workers with jobs below 12 hours a week, temporary contracts lasting longer than one
year (100,000), home-based workers (55,000), and workers on outplacement (80,000). Adding these
categories to EBB’s estimate of 830,000 flex-workers in 1995 generates a total of 1,065,000 flex-workers
in 1995. EBB estimates an average of 920,000 flex-workers in 1996.
A decomposition and a characterization of flex-workers is given in Table 3. Workers on call and
workers with unspecified hours make up some 40 percent of flex-workers. These workers get closest to
flexible labor input, directly responsive to the spur of the moment. Most of them are women. Note that
not all of this work is at the lowest job levels. Temporary substitutes make up 8 percent, again mostly
women. Temporary workers, making up almost one-quarter of flex-workers, certainly provide for flexible
adjustment to labor demand. But workers on contracts for less than one year, more than a quarter of the
number of flex-workers, are certainly not exclusively hired in conjunction with demand fluctuations.
Whereas this category will be hired by employers in case of demand uncertainty, the short-term contract
is also used as a probationary contract, to check out worker’s capabilities. These contracts are often
stepping-stones toward regular, tenured jobs. Indeed, among workers with a temporary job in 1992, two-
thirds had a tenured job 2 years later. Among workers with a flexible contract in 1988, half of them had a
tenured job in 1991. This is not necessarily with the same employer, though. Flex-work may simply refer
to a certain stage in a worker’s career. Quite frequently, it covers a starting job for young workers38
TABLE 3
Types of Flexible Contracts
Number of contracts 1996
Temp worker 214,400
23.30%




Temporary contracts, less than 1 year 249,600
27.10%
Contracts with unspecified hours 101,900
11.10%
Total 919,400
Source: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Maandelijkse Analyse, Flexibele Arbeid in
Perspectief, September 1997.39
19All the data mentioned here are from the Department of Labor Memorandum (SZW, 1997).
20The Act on Flexibility and Security and the Act on Allocation of Employees by Intermediary
Organizations (WAADI) are both nearly fully based on unanimous advice from the Foundation of Labor in a
government memorandum on these issues.
and re-entering women. Almost half the workers in a flexible job are under 25. In fact, for workers older
than 25, the share of tenured contracts has been stable at 90 percent for the last 10 years.
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The growth of employment through temporary work agencies from virtually nothing in the late
1960s to over 200,000 person-years in 1997 has created a large market for temp agencies, and allowed
some to grow into large agents in the European market (e.g., Randstad). Over time, the role of temp
agencies has changed. As noted above, flex-workers come in two categories. The first group is workers
on probation. Temp agencies serve as intermediaries for the selection and hiring of such workers. If
accepted, the workers get trained by the firm and move on to tenured positions. The second group
includes the flex-workers hired to match demand fluctuations. Here, agencies also apply a sharp
selection, as the quality of their workers is important for their market share (OSA, 1996, p. 138).
Unions have come to accept the role of temp agencies. Whereas initially they attempted to
prevent temporary work as much as possible, they have now chosen to bargain a collective agreement for
workers employed through these agencies. New legislation, Flexibiliteit en zekerheid (Flexibility and
Security, accepted May 1998 and in force by January 1999), gives temp and flex-workers more
protection.
20 Workers on call should be paid for at least 3 hours per call. A contract with a temporary
work agency is now considered an employment contract. After 26 weeks, the legal rules for a sequence of
temporary employment contracts apply, which implies that the contract gives entitlement to a tenured
position after three consecutive temporary contracts with the same employer. Collective agreements may
set other rules, however. The maximum duration of 6 months for a temporary work contract has been
eliminated (SZW, Sociale Nota, 1998, p. 117).40
The volume of temporary work has closely paralleled the business cycle, except for a structural
increase in the mid-1980s, from about 1 percent of the employment volume in 1982 to 2 percent in 1986.
(De Koning et al., 1995, p. 128). On the labor supply side, in the early 1990s about a quarter of the
workers sought jobs as holiday workers and about a fifth sought the individual advantages of temporary
work. More than half the temp workers were looking for permanent positions. On the demand side, in
1993, 44 percent of the firms hired temp workers specifically for temporary jobs, 31 percent for
substituting personnel, and 16 percent as the first step in hiring permanent workers. Thus, temp agencies
have a foot in two markets: temporary flex-work and the initial probation stage of regular tenured
positions. This fits in with the tendency of firms to contract out parts of their personnel departments.
The market structure for agencies dealing with job placement and labor market mediation has
changed quite drastically. Until 1990, the Public Employment Service was a government monopoly for
job placement services (intermediation between supply and demand), and there were only a few permits
for temporary work agencies. In 1991, the service became an “Independent Administrative Agency”—an
agency with a specified administrative task, a public body but not under the control of the Minister.
Membership of its Central Board has a tripartite composition, as does the membership of the 28 Regional
Boards (see next section). The Central Board is authorized to give out licenses for Temp Work Agencies
and for Job Placement Agencies, and this has led to an abundant growth: 887 for the former and 908 for
the latter in 1994 (OSA, 1996, p. 135). Not all license holders are active, however. According to the
annual reports of the employer association of temp agencies, ABU, there are about 300 active agencies.
Moreover, under the old “monopoly,” private agencies were active anyway (De Koning et al., 1995, p.
121). As of July 1998, temporary work agencies no longer need a license. The share of temporary work
agencies in filling vacancies was constant between 1988 and 1993, at 7 percent. The Employment Service
has a share that fluctuates countercyclically (increasing with unemployment), between 8 and 14 percent.41
The market for job placement and mediation has seen the development of new activity, new
partnerships, and thus a new market structure after the demonopolization (Bergman, 1997). Job
placement and related services are now provided by the Public Employment Service, by the Social
Insurance Organizations, by commercial temp work agencies, and by agencies for government-subsidized
job creation. These agents cooperate in many ways to offer their services jointly and to make a living (or
a profit) from the funding that is available from the government, the social security services, unions, and
employers. For example, in the biscuit industry redundancies emerged from reorganizations. A temp
agency, Randstad, has contracted to hire these redundant workers, train them, and seek alternative
employment; they are hired as regular employees, not as temporary workers (Salverda, 1997b, p. 4). In
the collective agreement for the Metal and Electrical Engineering sector, 0.5 percent of the wage bill has
been set aside for job creation, placement, and training. A special nonprofit foundation has been created
to implement these plans (Bergman, 1997, p. 79). Often commercial intermediaries are also employed to
implement such job creation agreements in collective bargaining. A temp agency (Manpower) and the
city of Amsterdam cooperate, on the basis of funding by the central government, to mediate long-term
unemployed into private sector jobs at heavily subsidized rates (De Telegraaf, September 19, 1997), i.e.,
at Dfl 5 per hour.
Layoff regulation may have an important impact on labor market flows. After some recent
deregulation, Dutch layoff regulations are not particularly restrictive in comparison with other European
countries (OSA, 1996, p. 107), either in terms of arrangements in collective labor agreements or in terms
of legal provisions in case of mass layoff. Exceptional by international standards is the case of individual
layoff. Here, employers can select from two routes. The route through the Regional Employment Agency
applies “preventive evaluation”: the director tests the dismissal for reasonableness. If permission is
granted, there is no compensation for damages. The procedure has recently been shortened. Appeal is not
possible. The other route is through the court. A fired worker can make a claim in court, and if granted,42
the judge will set the compensation. The court route is faster. There is some shift toward this route, in
particular if employers fear that the case for dismissal is not outright convincing to the director of the
Regional Employment Agency (OSA, 1996, p. 106).
4.2 The Employment Service
Originally, as noted, the Employment Service was a public monopoly. Registration at a regional
employment office was required for entitlement to certain benefits, such as Unemployment Benefits. The
Employment Service was also active in training and retraining programs. In 1991, the Service was
drastically reorganized. It became independent, with a tripartite Central Board: employer federations,
union federations, and the central government. The Central Board supervised 28 Regional Boards,
administered by employer, union, and local government representatives. The move from a government
agency to a joint body of social partners and government and a decentralization with regional boards
were meant to improve the employment service by integrating the activities of all agents and drawing
fully on the information that each had available, and by integration and cooperation with the government
agencies administering welfare, social insurance, and welfare provisions. Municipalities were included
because they were responsible for welfare benefits and for policies to reintegrate recipients into the labor
market. It has been a long-standing complaint that organizations that provide for social benefits
(disability, unemployment, social assistance), and that should stimulate clients back into the labor
market, have poor coordination with job placement services.
The reforms started out in conflict and confusion. From the beginning, the Central Board failed
to operate as the central steering body that had been envisioned. The central government severely cut the
budget, in spite of explicit legal guarantees of a specified annual budget. An evaluation committee
reporting to the Minister of Social Affairs drew very harsh conclusions (Commissie Van Dijk, 1995). The
Central Board never managed to define and implement good policies. The evaluation committee
attributed this to the fact that board members operated strictly as representatives of their principals, to43
21De Koning et al. (1995), pp. 54–57. The data provided by the Employment Service itself are unreliable
because of intertemporal changes in definitions, different applications by different Regional Boards, and lack of
checks and controls. Hence, the Central Board has not managed to set up a reliable registration system for its
performance (pp. 47–51). De Koning et al. use data from surveys on employers’ hiring behavior. In view of the
unreliability of the data, it does not make sense to evaluate the performance of the Employment Service in terms of
target groups such as women and ethnic minorities, for which only data from the Service are available.
financial asymmetry (only the government incurred any cost), and to an inconsistency in the position of
the ministerial representatives: the Minister of Social Affairs participates in the policies of the Board, but
the Employment Service Act also holds the Minister responsible for supervision of the policies of the
Board. The committee concluded that the Central Board has not been able to set up an adequate
administrative system, either for financial accounting or for the output of the Boards (job placements,
participation in training and other programs, etc.), that it has not succeeded in coordinating and unifying
policies of the Regional Boards, and that there has been no integration of administration and counseling
of benefit recipients and jobseekers by the different authorities in local government (such as local welfare
departments) and in social insurance (such as the Industry Boards, at that time involved in disability
insurance). However, at the level of the Regional Boards the evaluation committee found some
improvement in cooperation, both among the public agencies and among these agencies and the social
partners. In general, the committee was rather negative about the effectiveness of the placement and
training activities.
In 1993, the Employment Service spent almost half its total expenditures on schooling programs,
20 percent on mediation, 13 percent on reintegration and work experience programs, 8 percent on
information and counseling, and 10 percent on other activities (De Koning et al., 1995, p. 209). The
evaluation of the reorganization by De Koning et al. (1995) is rather critical. There is no evidence of an
improvement in the market share in job placements
21 or in the labor market matching process. De Koning
et al. have reviewed some 50 school program effect studies covering the period 1985–1994; only four of
them analyze the impact of schooling programs properly by using a control group. The studies suggest a44
substantial effect of some specific schooling programs, with the highest effect for deprived
groups—unskilled, long-term unemployed, the elderly. But the evaluation study concludes that in
general, “there is no evidence that all RBAs are very efficient in spending for schooling programs” (p.
237). It is interesting to note how Regional Boards (RBAs) have reacted to a change in incentives. With
more emphasis on job placement scores as the goal of the Employment Service, activities have indeed
shifted toward placement, using more placement officers, and less expenditure directed toward schooling
programs (pp. 237–238). RBAs explicitly acknowledge this policy change (p. 84).
Has the “corporatization” of the Employment Service paid off? Certainly not in the period
1991–1994. There is no evidence that the service has been more effective than before. A key problem
appears to be the failure of the Central Board to provide the Regional Boards with clear guidance on the
administration of their activities and a system of critical assessment of effectiveness. Glebbeek and Sol
(1998) largely agree with the evaluation of poor performance (although they put more emphasis on
improvements at the local level), but they argue that the reform was not really in the corporatist direction,
and that it was unwarranted to expect direct success of a new structure that should be allowed to develop
and mature. In their view the new structure was not corporatist because it lacked centralization and “rank
and file” compliance—no binding bargaining at the top implemented top-down by the partners.
In 1997, the Law on the Employment Service 1996 became active. The public employment
service became more focused on problematic elements in the job matching process, namely on job
seekers with low employment probabilities and on vacancies that are hard to fill. Government funding is
divided into a budget for basic service and a budget for particular targets (40 percent of the Dfl 1.4
billion budget going to the former in 1998, 60 percent to the latter). Part of the budget for employment
and job placement services is no longer given directly to the public employment service but to local
government and agencies in the social security administration. The shift in emphasis means that the45
22De Koning (1999) claims that his negative evaluation of the reforms also applies to the more recent
years—no relative improvement for vulnerable categories.
government leaves a larger share of job mediation services to the private sector, stepping back to focus
more explicitly on problems that the market is least likely to solve.
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5. AN ASSESSMENT
5.1 Assessing the “1982 Program”
The long and strong postwar recovery ended in the 1970s with the “Dutch Disease”: strong
expansion of the welfare state—in part financed by the proceeds of natural gas, gas exports that pushed
the guilder to a high level and thus crowded out other exports and employment—and a political paralysis,
in which the need for reform was recognized but not implemented. The year 1982 is regarded as the
turning point, although only in hindsight can it be seen as yielding something like a coherent program:
wage restraint, government retrenchment, welfare reform, work sharing, “flexibilization.”
Wage restraint was convincingly realized. The government certainly retreated. The welfare state
has been drastically reorganized, with much direct control taken away from the social partners. Work
sharing and flexibilization marched hand in hand, as redistribution of hours worked across the labor force
has led to a loss in the share of regular full-time jobs and an increase in the share of part-time and
flexible contracts. The volume of temporary work has greatly expanded. The organization of labor
market mediation and job placement has undergone a major overhaul after the government monopoly was
abolished, and new partnerships of public and private organizations have emerged.
Employment has drastically changed in composition. Exaggerating a little, we may say that most
employment has been lost in full-time male manufacturing jobs and that much has been gained in
services. These services are both high level and low level. They provide many opportunities for women,
including women who want to work part-time. Restructuring has not taken place within the labor force.46
23Hemerijck (1994) gives the same assessment: essential continuity, in spite of an interval of polarization
between 1968 and 1982.
The exit from manufacturing was not linked to the entry into services; exit meant exit from the labor
force (disability, long-term unemployed, welfare). The heritage of disconnected outflow and inflow is the
large stock of benefit recipients.
Is this a success story? If we take the perspective of the entire postwar period, there are several
indications that the interval between 1973 and 1983 is the exception, not the post-1983 period. In that
sense, the “miracle” of the recovery is not a miracle at all, but a restoration of the earlier position.
“Restoration” took place in wage determination, in social security, and in productivity. Moderate wage
development is a Dutch postwar tradition that got disrupted in the late 1960s and early 1970s, after a long
period of high excess demand in the labor market. The welfare state was strongly expanded during the
1970s, and in the early 1980s absorbed many into benefit recipiency. Restoration of benefit levels started
in the early 1980s, and by the mid-1990s they were back at the level of 1970. GDP growth resumed its
old track: “The position of the Netherlands in terms of GDP per capita relative to Northwestern Europe is
now more or less the same as it used to be in the 1960s and 1970s” (Van Ark and de Haan, 1997, p. 22).
The policy was not a mere resetting of parameters. There have been substantial institutional
reforms in social security and the employment service. Bargaining over the employment contract,
however, has taken place in an essentially stable system of labor relations, even though appearances have
changed.
23 It is still a system with intense, high-level coordination and consultation, as in a truly
corporatist structure. Its precise contribution to wage restraint is hard to determine. The CPB study
discussed earlier (CPB, 1991) allocates three-quarters of the reduction in labor’s income share to the
effect of the high unemployment rate, but the reaction coefficient of wages to excess supply of course
already includes an institutional effect of the Dutch bargaining tradition. The impact of institutions on
labor market outcomes is much debated (see Teulings and Hartog, 1998), but a recent OECD study47
certainly supports the beneficial effects of labor market coordination (Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta,
1998). Broersma, Koeman, and Teulings (1999), after estimating a small econometric model, argue that
the residuals from their wage equation show no sign of wage moderation after 1982; if anything,
moderation started before then, about 1975. However, the residuals from the wage equation have a strong
impact on employment. In their analysis, the key changes are those in labor supply induced by changes in
social benefits (i.e., increased generosity in the 1970s, reduced generosity since the mid-1980s.)
Introducing increased labor market flexibility has certainly been facilitated by corporatist
coordination in the Dutch vein. There is reason to doubt whether work sharing has contributed to a better
economic performance. But if there has been any virtue to it, it is also related to the flexible
implementation, the combination of reduced worker hours with increased operating hours, and the say of
management in the timing of work and leisure.
In welfare-state reform, the biggest success seems to be the reduction of sickness incidence.
Perhaps this was relatively easy, because the population of the sick has a high turnover, and flows are
easier to control than stocks. Disability is a much more permanent condition than sickness. The volume
of the disability recipient population is still high and inflow has recently again surpassed outflow. Many
people still receive unemployment-related benefits.
5.2 A Dutch Model?
In terms of institutional structure, if there is anything like a Dutch model, it is the Dutch brand of
corporatism, with consultation, coordination, and bargaining over all important issues of socioeconomic
policy between union federations, employer federations, and the government. The Dutch example shows
that corporatist institutions are not synonymous with suffocating rigidity. Instead, they appear to allow
for much flexibility. International comparative analyses confirm this (Teulings and Hartog, 1998;
Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta, 1998). But the tango for market and state has changed the model and,
characteristically, in different directions. In job mediation and matching, the government monopoly has48
24The new proposals are discussed in a special issue of Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 84 (4201),
April 29, 1999. The discussion centers around the balance between the private and the public share in organizing the
transition from unemployment and social security recipient status to a job. The policy goal is to increase financial
incentives through private sector competition.
25Private insurance companies report (large) losses on their sickness insurance and raise premiums,
sometimes substantially. However, it is commonly alleged that they started out with premiums that were too low so
they could gain market share at the introduction of privatization.
been abandoned, the market for mediation services has been opened up for the private sector, and the
public service has been given a corporatist governance structure. In social security, the corporatist
structure has been demolished, governance has been made independent, and administration will be
privatized. The reorganization of the employment service and social security continues, and it is not yet
clear where the tango dancers will end up. The government is now establishing 200 local Centers for
Work and Income: one front desk for local welfare benefit, a benefit for disability or unemployment
administered by the privatized UVIs, a job placement and job search service for the employment service.
In the most recent proposals, disability benefit claims will be evaluated by a public servant, stationed
with the private UVIs. Job placement services for the hard-core unemployed will be bought from private
organizations, and the Public Employment Service will disappear. Supervision of the Centers for Work
and Income will be by a board with membership from social partners, local government, and independent
members. The tango is moving into complicated twists.
24
The institutional reforms so far have not paid off visibly, except perhaps in the case of the
privatization of sickness benefits.
25 This may very well be related to sustained absence of financial
incentives for the administrative agents. The unemployment benefit was once administered by Industry
Associations, but the Associations had no incentive whatsoever to reduce incidence and duration of
unemployment. No one within the Associations had a particular interest in reducing the caseload.
Differentiation of unemployment insurance was not very relevant, with only one-tenth of the average
premium variable across sectors. After 2.5 years, an unemployed worker gets benefits from national, tax-
funded sources, and administrative agencies are in no way rewarded for getting the long-term49
unemployed back to work. Disability used to be administered by Industry Associations, assisted by a
Medical Service for claim evaluation, but the agencies had no incentives to reduce their caseload; they
were not rewarded for performance. Instead, it has often been suggested that employers, unions, and the
government all had their own motives for preferring the disability channel to the unemployment benefit
channel (Teulings, van der Veen, and Trommel, 1997, p. 250). In the new structure, administration is
done by UVIs, but as long as employers have no free choice of UVI, there is no premium on efficiency.
In Sickness Insurance, also initially administered by Industry Associations, there was no premium on
efficiency. With the privatization of sickness insurance, and free choice by employers of the agency to
fulfill the legal requirement to have professional guidance on prevention and reintegration, this is the
only program that has a clear premium on efficiency. In the Employment Service, there was no real
premium on performance until the introduction of a new funding system in the Employment Service Act
1996, including performance-related budgets for hard-core unemployed (Glebbeek and Sol, 1998). This
leads to an important conclusion. With the exception of sickness insurance, the complete administrative
overhaul—the “decorporatization” of social security and the corporatization of the Employment
Service—has meant that basic financial incentives for the administrative agencies have largely been
absent. Only in case of the general welfare benefit or social assistance (“Bijstand”) have the local
government agencies come under tighter monitoring by the central government. But here, too, the
financial incentives are adverse: if the local government spends resources to reduce the caseload, the
largest financial gain accrues to the central government (because it pays 90 percent of the benefits). In
light of this, it is not surprising that the incidence of social security recipiency has not been reduced.
Only real incentives can make the difference here. Further reforms are under discussion, but as long as
they do not generate substantial incentives, the impact, no doubt, will be negligible. The tango goes on,
and swirls into hitherto unknown figures. And it is hard to predict where the dance will end.     51
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